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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
desire in the purchaser for the early death of the ancestor. And, in
addition, it has been held that an assignment operates as a fraud upon
the ancestor, perhaps deluding him into leaving his property not to
the person intended but to a stranger."4 Thus it would appear that of
the two, the release is looked on less harshly because it generally keeps
the inheritance in the family and is more in the nature of a family
settlement, which is favored by the courts. 55
It would appear that Allen v. Allen and Coward v. Coward actually
left little room for doubt as to the validity of the relase of an expectancy
in North Carolina. However, the seemingly square holding contra in
Cannon v. Nowell caused confusion in this area. Price v. Davis has
at last removed this confusion.
THOMAS STEPHEN BENNETT
Fire Insurance-Estate by the Entirety-Insurable Interest-Right
to Proceeds
A husband and wife own an estate in land as tenants by the entirety.
The spouses are separated, the husband remaining the occupant of the
dwelling-house. He insures the home in his name alone for $4,000 and
pays the premiums from his own funds. The home burns and pending
payment of the claim by the insurance company the spouses obtain an
absolute divorce. To whom do the proceeds of the policy belong?
The above facts presented a case of first impression in North Caro-
lina.' The supreme court, reversing the decision of the trial court,
held in Carter v. Continental Ins. Co.2 that the husband's interest in
the property was not insurable for his benefit alone as a separate moiety
apart from the estate owned by him and his wife and the proceeds of a
policy so taken inured to the benefit of the entire estate. Thus, upon
absolute divorce the wife was entitled to one half of the proceeds,8
even though she was not named as insured or beneficiary in the policy
and had not contributed to the payment of premiums.
Ordinarily a fire insurance policy is a personal contract to indemnify
the insured for a loss sustained;4 and where one has an insurable in-
3 McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139, 147, 25 N. E. 179, 182 (1890).
" In re Edelman's Estate, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962 (1905) ; Hale v. Hollon,
90 Tex. 427. 39 S. W. 287 (1897) ; See SImEs & SMITrH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 395
(2d ed. 1956).
" Bank of Wadesboro v. Hendley, 229 N. C. 432, 50 S. E. 2d 302 (1948);
Redwine v. Clodfeter, 226 N. C. 366, 38 S. E. 2d 203 (1946) ; Fish v. Hanson, 223
N. C. 143, 25 S. E. 2d 461 (1943).
1 Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., 242 N. C. 578, 89 S. E. 2d 122 (1955).
2242 N. C. 578, 89 S. E. 2d 122 (1955).
' Divorce converts a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common.
'VANCE, INSURANCE § 13 (1951).
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terest in the property and pays the premiums from his own funds, the
proceeds inure to his sole benefit.5 Normally, one not a party to a fire
insurance contract can have no lawful claim in any amount realized by
the insured.6 In view of these general insurance principles, it is interest-
ing to observe the rationale of the court in reaching a seemingly con-
trary result in the Carter case. The facts of the case raise questions
concerning theories which the court did not consider in its opinion. It
is the purpose of this note to explore these questions. There seem
to be relatively few cases concerning the points of law involved; therefore
analogies must be drawn from related cases.
It is seemingly well settled in most jurisdictions that the husband
has an insurable interest 7 in the whole of the premises held by him and
his wife as tenants by the entireties.8 The case of Conley v. Fidelity-
Phenix Fire Ins. Co.9 presented an interesting problem. The husband
and wife owned certain property by the entireties which included a
$4,000 home. The husband insured the home for $2,000 and loss oc-
curred. The insurance company resisted on the ground that the hus-
band's interest was limited to half of the value of the policy since the
wife had an equal interest in the property. The court held that he was
entitled to the full amount of the insurance, saying that the policy covered
the interest of the insured-which in a tenancy by the entirety is of the
whole and not of the moiety.10
'Wattenbarger v. Tullock, 280 S. W. 2d 925 (Tenn. 1955).
'See Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 523, 84 S. E. 2d 419, 423 (1954): "... if
the insurance so procured exceeds the value of the insured's insurable interest, then
the excess is of no concern to any other person who also has an interest in the
property, but it is a question exclusively between the insured and the insurer."
"See Federal Land Bank v. Atlas Assurance Co., 188 N. C. 747, 125 S. E.
631 (1934) (any interest is insurable if peril insured against would bring pecuniary
loss upon insured by immediate and direct effect) ; BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 942
(4th ed. 1951) (all that is required for an insurable interest is ". . . such a real
and substantial interest in specific property as will prevent the contract from being
a mere wager policy"). The exact nature of of the husband's interest in an estate
by the entirety might be one or more of the following: (1) right of survivorship
(2) right of usufruct (3) his interest in the estate (4) the joint interest in the
estate.
' North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Sciandra, 256 Ala. 409, 54 So. 2d
764, 27 A. L. R. 2d 1047 (1951) (where husband and wife each owned undivided
one-half interest in property destroyed, held: husband's insurable interest under
the policy in his name was not confined to his estate in the property but his
interest extended to pecuniary benefit expected from its continued existence);
Emery v. Clark, 303 Mich. 461, 6 N. W. 2d 746 (1942) (where creditor sought
to have policy issued in name of husband on tenancy by the entirety reformed to
include the wife in order to get judgment against both, held: husband had insurable
interest in the whole of the premises in his own right and policy may not be
reformed) ; Clawson v. Citizen's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 121 Mich. 591, 80 N. W. 573,
68 A. L. R. 365 (1899); Miotke v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Lien Ins. Co., 113
Mich. 166, 71 N. W. 463 (1897); Lux v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 30
S. W. 2d 1090 (Mo. App. 1930).
' 102 F. Supp. 474 (W. D. Ark. 1952).
"0 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6. (Casner ed. 1952): each spouse
is seised per tout et non per iny.
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In some jurisdictions the failure of the husband to disclose the in-
terest of his wife may void the policy for breach of warranty that he
was sole and unconditional owner of the fee in the premises." However,
G. S. § 58-180.112 removes this from consideration in the instant case,
since it provides that the naming of either spouse alone shall be sufficient
and the policy shall not be void for a failure to disclose the interest of
the other spouse. 13 It may be noted that the statute does not state that
the insurer will be liable for the full value of the policy but only that
it shall not be void. In the principal case the insurer admitted liability
on the policy; thus the litigation concerned only the rights of the re-
spective spouses to the proceeds of the policy paid into court.
The estate by the entirety exists in North Carolina as at common
law with all its incidents.14 These incidents were vividly set out by
the late Chief Justice Stacy in his notable opinion in Davis v. Bass15 and
were relied on by the court in the Carter case. Those pertinent to the
instant case appear to be:
(a) The estate is based on the common law doctrine that a hus-
band and wife were regarded as one person, and a conveyance
to them by name was a conveyance in law to but one person.
(b) Each spouse is seised per tout et non per my, each being
seised of the whole and not of a moiety or undivided portion.
(c) The husband is entitled to the rents and profits of the land
for his life (unsufruct).
(d) The estate is only severed by absolute divorce or by consent
of both parties.
(e) One spouse, without the consent of the other can neither have
the property partitioned nor sell the whole or a part thereof.
(f) Upon the death of either spouse the entire estate vests in the
other, not solely by right of survivorship, but also by virtue of the
grant which vested the entire estate in each grantee.
"' Cook v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ass'n, 139 W. Va. 700, 83 S. E. 2d 71 (1954)
But see Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 35 F. 2d 675 (6th Cir. 1929). The
latter case said that under the law of Tennessee there is but one owner; the legal
existence of the wife is incorporated into that of the husband. Thus insurance in
the name of the husband procured on an estate by the entirety satisfies the policy
requirement of sole and unconditional ownership.
" N. C. GEx. STAT. § 58-180.1 (1950): "Policy issuted to husband or wife onjoint property.-Any policy of fire insurance issued to husband or wife, on build-
ings and household furniture owned by the husband and wife, either by entirety, in
common, or jointly, either name of one of the parties in interest named as the
insured or beneficiary therein, shall be sufficient and the policy shall not be void
for failure to disclose the interest of the other, unless it appears that in procuring
of the issuance of such policy, fraudulent means or methods were used by the in-
sured or owner thereof."
" See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30 (1950) which provides that statements in an
application of insurance shall be deemed representations and not warranties.
x' Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms Inc., 239 N. C. 481, 86 S. E. 2d 472 (1954).188 N. C. 200, 204-09, 124 S. E. 566, 567-71 (1924).
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Legal separation does not affect the rights of the parties in the estate, 16
but divorce absolute converts the tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy
in common by operation of law.' 7
In the Carter case the supreme court did not comment on an interest-
ing theory which prevails in some jurisdictions. In Scutella v. County
Fire Ins. Co.' s a husband took out insurance in his name alone on prop-
erty held by himself and his wife as tenants by the entireties. It was
held that when the husband died, after loss but pending payment of the
claim, the wife was entitled to the whole of the proceeds by right of
survivorship.19 This would seem to import the idea that the proceeds
due on the policy in one sense replaced the property destroyed and were
impressed with its real property characteristics2 If this were the posi-
tion of North Carolina it would greatly simplify the situation in the
Carter case. It seems that North Carolina, however, follows a con-
trary view in this type of situation.2 ' An analysis of a few similar cases
seems to verify this proposition. It is well settled that a tenancy by the
entirety does not exist in personal property in North Carolina.22
It has been held that a life tenant insuring his interest is entitled
to the proceeds of the policy without having to share with the
remainderman.23 The life tenant may recover not merely in proportion
to the value of his life estate but for the full amount due under the
policy up to the fee value of the property destroyed.2 4  In In re will of
Wilson2 5 the husband held a life estate by curtesy right after his wife
1" Freeman v. Belfer, 173 N. C. 581, 92 S. E. 486 (1917). The majority of the
court were of- opinion that divorce a tnensa et thoro did not sever the marital
relationship and thus did not affect the rights of the spouses in a tenancy by the
entirety. There were vigorous dissents.
17 McKinnon v. Caulk, 167 N. C. 411, 83 S. E. 559 (1914). It severs the unity
of person, one of the five unities required in the holding of the title as tenants by
the entireties.18231 App. Div. 343, 247 N. Y. S. 689 (4th Dep't 1931).
" Rigby v. Allegany County Cooperative Fire Ins. Co., 242 App. Div. 809, 275
N. Y. S. 211 (4th Dep't 1934) (memorandum decision following the Scutella case
as conclusive).
20 Rolater v. Rolater, 198 S. W. 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (a similar line of
reasoning was used: where a home is destroyed by fire, the proceeds of insurance
thereon stand in place of and instead of the insured property and has the same
character, community or separate, as the insured property); In re Hickman's
Estate, 41 Wash. 2d 519, 250 P. 2d 524 (1953).
-"See Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N. C. 396, 42 S. E. 2d 468 (1947); Stockton v.
Maney, 212 N. C. 231, 193 S. E. 137 (1937). But see Campbell v. Murphy, 55
N. C. 357 (1856) ; Graham v. Roberts, 43 N. C. 99 (1851).
"Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N. C. 515, 91 S. E. 2d 176 (1956) ; Turlington v.
Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923) ;' Note, 6 N. C. L. Rrv. 342 (1928).23 Stockton v. Maney, 212 N. C. 231, 193 S. E. 137 (1937). Where husband
held a life estate by curtesy right and insured the property, held: nothing else
appearing the husband insured only his interest in the dwelling and upon de-
struction by fire he was entitled to the entire proceeds of the policy and the
remainderman had no interest in the real property bought by the life tenant with
the proceeds.
2" Ibid.
D5224 N. C. 505, 31 S. E. 2d 543 (1944).
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died intestate. He insured the home for its full value and it was de-
stroyed by fire. The heirs of the deceased wife brought suit for their
ratable portion of the proceeds. The court held that unless an intention
to insure for the benefit of the heirs appeared, the husband was entitled
to the whole amount of the insurance. The rationale of this view ap-
pears to be: (1) that the interest of the life tenant and the remainder-
man are entirely separate (2) that the insurance arises not out of the
propery itself but from an independent contract.
However, the situation seems otherwise if a testator devises property
on which he holds insurance and loss occurs after his death. It has
been held that a life tenant under the devise receives the interest on the
proceeds in lieu of the use of the destroyed property and at his death the
principal passes to the remainderman.2 6  Apparently this is one instance
where North Carolina has followed the view that the proceeds in a sense
replace the property and retain its characteristics. 27
In another analogous insurance situation it has been held that one
joint owner may insure his interest to the exclusion of the other,28 and
in most instances collect the total amount of the insurance proceeds
for his sole benefit.29 Where a wife and husband held property by joint
tenancy and the wife insured the family dwelling as sole owner for its
full insurable value and paid the premiums from her own earnings, it
was held that she was entitled to the whole of the proceeds and the hus-
band could not maintain an action in law or equity for any portion there-
of.30 In this and other cases the courts declined to set up a fixed rule
as to the right of the non-insuring joint owner to share in the proceeds.
Rather the decision appeared to depend on "the equities of the particular
case" in deciding whether the other joint owner had a right to share
in the proceeds of the insured's personal contract.3 1
It seems clear in North Carolina that when an estate by the entirety
is sold the funds derived from the sale become personalty32 and are held
2 Graham v. Roberts, 43 N. C. 99 (1851). VANCE, INSURANCE § 133 (1951)
says that since the insurance policy is a personal contract, the right of action is in
the personal representatives of the deceased who hold the proceeds in trust for
those entitled to succeed by inheritance or devise to the insured property. This
doctrine applies only to inheritance or devise and not grants inter vivos.
27 See Graham v. Roberts, supra note 26; cf. Campbell v. Murphy, 55 N. C.
357 (1856).
28 14 AM. JuR., Cotenancy § 23 (1938).
2 Clapp v. Farmers Mutual Fire Ins. Assn, 126 N. C. 388, 35 S. E. 617
(1900) ; American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 205 S. W. 2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947).
2 Miles v. Miles, 211 Ala. 26, 99 So. 187 (1924) ; accord, Bell v. Barefield, 219
Ala. 319, 122 So. 318 (1929).
"1 Currier v. North British Etc. Co., 98 N. H. 366, 101 A. 2d 266 (1953)
Godfrey, Some Limited-Interest Problems, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 415, 423
(1950).
"2 Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923) (where husband
and wife sold an estate by the entirety and received mortgage secured by bonds,
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by the parties as tenants in common. 33 In Wilson v. ErvinU4 the hus-
band and wife sold property held by the entireties and the money was
deposited in the bank in the husband's name. After the death of the
husband, the wife asserted that she was entitfed to the whole amount of
the money by right of survivorship. It was held that no right of sur-
vivorship existed in such funds and she was entitled to only half. The
rationale of this view seems to be: (1) the sale of the property terminates
the estate by the entirety by joint act and consent of both spouses, making
them each entitled to half the proceeds as tenants in common. (2) the
money or claim for money replaces the property only in the sense that
it represents the value.P5 Similar cases in other jurisdictions have held
that such sale proceeds go by right of survivorship.
36
The court might have considered the theory that the husband in the
Carter case insured the property in trust for himself and his wife. It
seems clear that there was no intention present which is essential to the
existence of an express or implied trust.3 7 A constructive trust might be
plausible.38  Constructive trusts are created by courts of equity39 and
arise entirely by operation of law without reference to any actual or
supposed intention to create a trust but often contrary to such intention.
40
Generally a constructive trust is declared only when equity finds that
one has obtained or now retains title to property by any kind of wrong-
doing; or where, although title was obtained originally without fraud or
wrong, it is against equity that the property should be retained by him
held: the bonds were personal property and at the death of the husband jus ac-
crescendi did not apply to vest the whole of the proceeds in the wife) ; Moore v.
Greenville Banking and Trust Co., 178 N. C. 118, 100 S. E. 269 (1919) ; Note, 13
N. C. L. REv. 256 (1935). But cf. Place v. Place, 206 N. C. 676, 174 S. E.
747 (1934) ; Isley v. Sellars, 153 N. C. 374, 69 S. E. 279 (1910).
"Honeycutt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N. C. 734, 89 S. E. 598 (1955).
1227 N. C. 396, 42 S. E. 2d 468 (1947).
"For an excellent discussion of this doctrine see In re Estate of Blumenthal,
236 N. Y. 448, 141 N. E. 911, 30 A. L. R. 901 (1923).
" Koehring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433, 142 N. E. 117 (1924) (tenancy by the
entirety does not exist in personalty except as to personal property directly derived
from real estate held by that title such as proceeds arising from the sale of
property so held) ; Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 Atl. 635 (1923) ; Johnson v.
Johnson, 268 S. W. 2d 439 (Mo. App. 1954) (where husband and wife sold an
estate by the entirety and the money was deposited in the bank in the name of the
husband, held: proceeds of sale retained all features and characteristics of an
estate by the entiretly and upon the death of the husband the wife was entitled
to the whole amount of the deposit by right of survivorship) ; Citizens Sav. Bank
and Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 91 Vt. 13, 99 Atl. 250 (1916).
"
T BOGERT, TRUSTS § 77 (1952).
3 See Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 35 F. 2d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 1929)
(dictum) : "Nor do we decide that the husband is entitled to the sole and exclusive
enjoyment of the proceeds of the policy. . . . It might well be that the proceeds
are held by the husband as trustee for the wife and the wife's interest thus pre-
served." See note 11 supra for facts and holding of this case.
"Lefkowitz v. Silver, 182 N. C. 339, 109 S. E. 56 (1921).
"0 Speight v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 209 N. C. 563, 183 S. E. 734
(1936).
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who holds it.41 Evidence to establish a constructive trust must be clear,
strong, cogent, and convincing.42  It does not appear that in the prin-
cipal case the husband was guilty of any wrongdoing or that it would
be against equity to allow him to recover the full amount of the pro-
ceeds. The wife could have protected her own interest by insuring the
property in her own behalf.
The supreme court in the instant case did not comment on the
possibility that the insurance proceeds might have been impressed with
real property characteristics or that the husband procured the insurance
in trust for his wife. Rather it based the decision on the common law
nature of the estate. Since the husband and wife were each seised per
tout et non per my, there was no moiety of interest which the husband
could insure for his sole benefit.4 3 It seems both have an equal interest
in the res, but that interest is not severable.44 This distinguishes the
instant case from the analogous insurance cases previously considered.
Joint tenants are seised per tout et per my45 and tenants in common are
seised per my et non per tout.48  In each instance there is a per my
interest, a moiety, which one cotenant may claim as his own.
This apparently means that in North Carolina a husband must have
a moiety of interest in order to insure for his separate benefit. Is this
not contrary to accepted insurance theories? 47 The decision in the
Carter case does not appear to rest on any presumption that the husband
insures for the benefit of both spouses.48 Rather the rationale of the
court seems to be: (1) that the insurance policy as written and the loss
benefits created thereby inured to the benefit of the entire state as owned
by both husband and wife (2) that since the entire estate, as so insured,
was severed by absolute divorce, it necessarily follows that the wife is
entitled to half the proceeds of the policy. Though there was no ex-
press reference to the proceeds taking the characteristics of real prop-
erty ;the rationale seems to imply that the court treated the proceeds as
being endowed with the characteristics of an estate by the entireties be-
fore the divorce and necesarily taking the characteristics of tenancy in
.1 Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N. C. 288, 199 S. E. 83 (1938).2Atinson v. Atkinson, 225 N. C. 120, 33 S. E. 2d 666 (1945).
"But see Ross v. Ross, 35 N. J. Super. 242, 113 A. 2d 700 (1955). New Jersey
has modified the common law and asserts that in a tenancy by the entirety the
wife holds in her possession during their joint lives one half of the estate in com-
mon with her husband and as between themselves the respective rights of the
parties are those of tenants in common.
" Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941) ; New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Oates, 122 Fla. 540, 166 So. 269 (1936).
"12 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
"2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
"See note 7 supra.
'sCf. 48 C.J.S., Joint Tenancy § 14 (1947) which says where the act of onejoint tenant is beneficial to his cotenant, his act is regarded as the act of all so far
as sharing in the benefit of the act is concerned.
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common after divorce, thus enabling the wife to share in the proceeds.
This might mean then that the wife could have recovered half the pro-
ceeds prior to divorce absolute.
It may be noted in the instant case that the policy was issued in the
name of the husband. The question arises whether the result would
have been the same had the policy specifically excluded the wife. Ap-
parently this is the only further action which the husband here could




It is the opinion of the writer that by this decision the supreme
court has placed a restriction on the tenancy by the entirety which has
not before been judicially recognized. Just as neither spouse alone
can have the estate partitioned and neither alone can alienate his in-
terest, so likewise in North Carolina neither spouse can insure the
property to the exclusion of the other. Thus it appears that it becomes
another incident of the tenancy by the entirety which the parties accept
when they choose to hold such an estate.
WILLIAM H. KIRKMAN, JR.
Joint Tort-Feasors-Contribution-Effects of Statute on Covenant
Not to Sue
A recent New Jersey case, Sinootz v. lennil involved a problem
which has not been decided in North Carolina. The plaintiff was a
passenger in the defendant's cab and was injured in an accident between
the cab and a vehicle operated by a third party. In the plaintiff's action,
the defendant cab company filed a third party complaint against the other
driver for relief under the New Jersey Joint Tortfeasors Contribution
Law. 2  The other driver had obtained a covenant not to sue3 from the
" The equities of the instant case seem to be heavily in the husband's favor
since: (1) he had paid all the premiums from his own funds; (2) he had the
policy issued in his name alone; (3) the husband and wife were living separate
and apart when the policy was issued; (4) the insurance covered the homestead
in which the husband was residing.
1237 N. J. Super. 529, 117 A. 2d 675 (1955).
' N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -3 (1952): "For the purpose of this act
the term 'joint tortfeasors' means two or more persons jointly or severally liable
in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has
been recovered against all or some of them. . . . The right of contribution exists
among joint tortfeasors. . . . [Where a joint tortfeasor pays all or part of a
judgment] he shall be entitled to recover contribution from the other . . . joint
tortfeasors for the excess so paid over his pro rata share; but no person shall
be entitled to recover contribution under this act from any person entitled to be
indemnified by him in respect to the liability for which the contribution is
sought. ... "
'Where there are joint tort-feasors there can be but one recovery and a settle-
ment with one is a release of the others. Howard v. Plumbing Co., 154 N. C.
19561
